Abstract Two agents independently choose mixed m-recall strategies that take actions in finite action spaces A 1 and A 2 . The strategies induce a random play, a 1 , a 2 , . . ., where a t assumes values in A 1 × A 2 . An M -recall observer observes the play. The goal of the agents is to make the observer believe that the play is similar to a sequence of i.i.d. random actions whose distribution is Q ∈ ∆(A 1 × A 2 ). For nearly every t, the following event should occur with probability close to one: "the distribution of a t+M given a t , . . . , a t+M −1 is close to Q." We provide a sufficient and necessary condition on m, M , and Q under which this goal can be achieved (for large m).
Introduction
The motivation behind this work comes from the study of the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played through strategies of bounded recall (boundedrecall games). It turns out that the main problem is to estimate the individually rational level (IRL) of the bounded-recall games. In repeated games of perfect recall, the IRL is equal to that of the one-step game and therefore the folk theorem allows us to express the set of equilibrium payoffs in terms of the IRL of the onestep game. In bounded-recall games, the IRL may differ from that of the one-step game depending on the recall capacities of the players. So, if we are to find a "folk theorem" for bounded-recall games it should be expressed in terms of the IRL of the bounded-recall games.
In the special case of two-person games, the IRL is the value of a two-person zerosum game. Two pioneering works on the value of two-person zero-sum boundedcomplexity games are by Ben-Porath [BP93] (bounded-memory) and Lehrer [Leh88] (bounded-recall). Recently there has been some progress in the study of the value of two-person zero-sum bounded-complexity games due to the introduction of information theoretic methods by Neyman and Okada [NO00] . 1 Among the works that employ these methods are [NO09, Ney08, NS10, GT07] and the present work. In [Per08] we characterize the asymptotic value of zero-sum games, and hence 2 , also, the set of equilibrium payoffs in non-zero-sum two-person games.
In three-person games, the picture is less clear. Consider for example the case in which all three players have the same recall capacity. Lehrer's result on twoperson games implies that each player can simulate a mixed action such that the punished player cannot correlate with it. By each player simulating a mixed action independently of the others, the IRL in the bounded-recall game is shown to be (asymptotically) no greater than the IRL in the one-step game. Bavly and Neyman [BN03] show that in the presence of a deterministic public signal (that depends on an exponentially long recall) the team can simulate a correlated punishment (they term it "concealed correlation"); thus the IRL in the bounded-recall game with public signaling converges, as the recall capacity grows, to the value that the punished player can secure against the (correlated) team in the one-step game.
Is it possible to obtain concealed correlation without a public signal? This question motivates the present work. We analyze the class of random processes that can be implemented through bounded-recall strategies. We refer, in particular, to cyclic approximations of i.i.d. processes. For this class of processes, we obtain an asymptotic characterization of what can be implemented through bounded-recall strategies. It should be noted that a tight estimation of the IRL, and hence an asymptotic characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, remains an open problem.
Our possibility result, Theorem 2.1, is proved by constructing strategies for the punishing team. This construction relies on an explicit version of the construction needed in the zero-sum case. 3 The present construction relies on a cycle of actions in which a large majority of the actions, in a fixed set of positions, are chosen uniformly at random, whereas the rest of the actions are chosen such that the entire cycle satisfies some local constraints. The local constraints are of the form that can be dealt with by Lovász's local lemma [AS00, p. 65] obtaining an implicit construction. The fact that most of the actions are chosen uniformly at random guarantees that the entire cycle preserves properties of a true random cycle. This feature is hard to achieve through an implicit construction.
Our impossibility result, Theorem 2.3, is obtained by proving information constraints on the limiting average of the play induced by mixed m-recall strategies. The stationarity of the limiting average play makes it suitable for information theoretic analysis.
In Section 4, we relate the analysis of implementable processes to the computation of the IRL in bounded-recall games. We establish a few results and present several problems for future research.
1 Methods of information theory appear also in [Leh88] 2 See Theorem 4 in [Leh88] 3 See Proposition 4.9 in [Per08] .
Results
Let A = A 1 ×A 2 be a finite alphabet. A pure m-recall strategy 4 for agent i (i = 1, 2) is a function σ :
σ(a) = σ(a n−m+1 , . . . , a n ).
The set of pure m-recall strategies for agent i is denoted Σ i (m). A pair of pure (mrecall) strategies σ, τ induces a play (a t ) t∈N . The induced play is defined recursively by
• a n+1 = (σ(a 1 , . . . , a n ), τ (a 1 , . . . , a n )).
A mixed m-recall strategy for agent i is a probability measure on (the discrete space) Σ i (m). A pair of mixed (m-recall) strategies induces a measure on the set of plays.
The entropy of a discrete random variable X is defined by
The entropy is a function of the distribution of X; therefore if Q is a probability measure over a finite set, we can define
We denote by Q n the n-fold product of Q. The entropy of Q n is exactly nH(Q). The distribution of a sequence of random variables x 1 , . . . , x n is called an -approximation of Q n , if
To illustrate the meaning of an -approximation it can be shown that for every > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for every n, if the distribution of x 1 , . . . , x n is a δ-approximation of Q n then
The left-hand side of the above inequality is the expected L 1 -distance between Q and the distribution of x t given x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ; where t is chosen at random from {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, by Markov's equality, the following event occurs in probability greater than 1 − √ : the L 1 -distance between Q and the distribution of x t given x 1 , . . . , x t−1 is less than √ . The present paper characterizes the asymptotic values of m and M , for which a team of two m-recall agents can produce an -approximation of Q M . The significant parameters turn out to be the ratio between M and m and the entropy of Q, Q 1 and Q 2 , where Q i is the marginal of Q on the ith coordinate.
Our first theorem is a possibility result. For a finite or countable set A we denote the set of probability measures on A by ∆(A).
Theorem 2.1. Let A 1 and A 2 be finite alphabets. Let 
then there exist mixed m-recall strategies for agents one and two that take actions in A 1 and A 2 , respectively, whose induced play, a 1 , a 2 , . . ., satisfies that for every t ≥ exp ((H(Q 1 ) + H(Q 2 ))m), the distribution of a t+1 , . . . , a t+M is an -approximation of Q M .
The next theorem is a converse version of Theorem 2.1.
For every δ > 0 there exists > 0 such that for every m, M and every pair of mixed m-recall strategies, if the induced play, a 1 , a 2 , . . ., is such that there exists t 0 such that for every t ≥ t 0 , a t+1 , . . . , a t+M is an -approximation of Q M , then
.
Let us now examine condition (2.1). It can be rearranged as
The expression
is the mutual information of the random variables (a 1 , a 2 ) → a i defined on the probability space A 1 × A 2 , Q . Formally, the mutual information of two discrete random variables X and Y is defined by
Another way of defining the mutual information is in terms of conditional entropy.
The entropy of X given Y is defined by
Pr(X = x|Y = y) log(Pr(X = x|Y = y)).
One can verify [CT06, p. 16 ] the chain rule of entropy which is
The chain rule implies that
Thus, condition (2.1) can be written as
The concavity of the entropy function and the definition of conditional entropy imply the conditional entropy inequality
and hence
For M ≤ 2m, inequality (2.2) implies that the condition (2.1a), and thus the condition of Theorem 2.1, holds for every Q. Theorem 2.2 is, in fact, a consequence of a more general impossibility result, Theorem 2.3. To obtain an impossibility result, one has to consider every play that can be implemented through mixed m-recall strategies. The set of these plays is not a "nice" mathematical object. To make it more tractable we consider the limiting average play (defined subsequently) instead of the play itself. The limiting average serves as a smoothing operator mapping eventually periodic plays (defined subsequently) to stationary plays. Although it is not injective, we don't lose valuable information by applying this operator since the payoff in the repeated game is a function of the limiting average play.
Note that the play induced by bounded-recall strategies enters a cycle at some point. In other words, it is eventually periodic. Formally, the group Z acts on A Z by (n.a) t = a t+n . For a positive integer n and a sequence a ∈ A N , n.a is also well defined. We say that a play a ∈ A N is eventually periodic 5 if there exists T > 0 such that T.a = (2T ).a.
The action of Z extends to measures on A Z by (n.µ)(F ) := µ({a : n.a ∈ F }). Let µ be a probability measure on the set of (eventually periodic) plays. The limiting average of µ (if it exists) is the following weak limit:
Note that the limiting average is stationary (i.e., Z-invariant), if it exists. If µ is supported in the set of eventually periodic sequences, then its limiting average exists. In particular, the limiting average exists for the play induced by mixed m-recall strategies.
The following theorem provides constraints on the (random) plays that can be implemented through mixed m-recall strategies.
Theorem 2.3. Let σ 1 , σ 2 be mixed m-recall strategies of agents one and two, respectively. The strategies induce a random play. Let a 1 , a 2 , . . . be random variables that distribute according to the limiting average of the induced play. For every integer M ≥ m. There exist random variables f, g that are functions of a 1 , . . . , a M such that
The above can be expressed in terms of conditional mutual information. The mutual information of X and Y given Z is defined by
5 Equivalently, we say that a ∈ A N is periodic if there exist T > 0 such that a = T.a, and a ∈ A N is eventually periodic if there exists S > 0 such that S.a is periodic.
where X, Y , and Z are discrete random variables. In analogy to (2.1a), inequality (2.3) can be rewritten as
(2.3a)
Proofs
We begin with some preliminaries. Let A be a finite set. The cardinality of A is denoted by |A|. Let l be a positive integer. The set {1, . . . , l} is denoted by [l] . Let a 1 , . . . , a l ∈ A. The empirical distribution of the sequence (a 1 , . . . , a l ) is the probability measure on A given by
For Q ∈ ∆(A), the set of all sequences of length l whose empirical distribution is Q is denoted T Q (l). Namely,
Proof. See [CT06] .
A Proof for Theorem 2.1
We would like to reduce Theorem 2.1 to an analogous combinatorial statement.
The combinatorial statement will use the following notion:
Definition 3.2. Let A and B be (finite) sets. A relation Γ ⊂ A × B is called homogeneous if for every (a, b), (a , b ) ∈ Γ there exist two permutations α : A → A and β : B → B such that
Lemma 3.3. Let A and B be finite alphabets. Let Γ A × B be a non-empty homogeneous relation. For every > 0, there exists m 0 ∈ N such that for every M ,
then there exist mixed m-recall strategies σ and τ that take actions in the disjoint union A∪ {#} and B∪ {#}, respectively, whose induced play, (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ), . . ., satisfies that for every t ≥ |A × B|
In addition, for every t ≥ 0 there exists
We first argue that Lemma 3.3 implies Theorem 2.1.
Proof. By continuity of the entropy function, we may assume w.l.o.g. that
. To see this, consider convex combinations of Q and Q 1 ⊗ Q 2 . For a positive integer w letQ be a closest element to Q in ∆(A 1 × A 2 ) \ ∆(A 1 ) × ∆(A 2 ) with respect to the property TQ(w) = ∅. Consider the auxiliary alphabets TQ 1 (w) and TQ 2 (w) and the relation TQ(w) TQ 1 (w) × TQ 2 (w). The symmetry group S w acts on TQ 1 (w) × TQ 2 (w) by π.(q 1 , . . . , q w ) = (q π(1) , . . . , q π(w) ). The relation TQ(w) is an orbit; therefore it is homogeneous.
Since lim w→∞ 1 w log TP (w) = H(P ), for P = Q, Q 1 , Q 2 , we can apply Lemma 3.3 (with a large w) to obtain strategies σ 1 and σ 2 that induce a play with the desired properties. Two concerns remain: (i) How to interpret the # action; (ii) Since the auxiliary alphabet is composed of sequences of true actions, one has to be able to tell where an auxiliary action begins given a history of the past m true actions.
Both concerns, (i) and (ii), are dealt with together. Consider agent i (i ∈ {1, 2}). Choose α ∈ A i such thatQ i (α) = 1. Let β = α be another element of A i . The interpretation of # will be the word (α, . . . , α) (i.e., w times α). The desired strategy (of agent i) will be the interpretation of σ i where any two successive auxiliary actions are separated by a β. The separator β is not a sub-string in the interpretation of the # action; therefore agent i can always identify the # actions. Since it is provided that at least one # action is taken in any time interval of length m, agent i is able to tell exactly where each auxiliary action begins.
We turn now to proving Lemma 3.3. First we make the following assumptions without loss of generality:
• The sets A and B are minimal with respect to the property that Γ ⊂ A × B.
• M ≥ m.
We shall describe the strategy of the first agent, σ. The strategy of the second agent, τ , is defined analogously (by replacing A with B as necessary).
Let us write
. At time t = K i + 1 mod M the agent takes the action #. At time t = K i + 1 mod M the agent takes actions in A. The time intervals between the # actions are called cells.
The actions in each cell are organized in a structure that will be described later.
The strategy acts in two stages. In the first stage the agent draws a (partially) random cycle that consists of L 1 · M actions. The cycle of the second agent consists of L 2 · M actions, where gcd(L 1 , L 2 ) = 1. Each agent repeats her cycle until they encounter a matching arch. The term "matching" will be defined later. Roughly speaking, it is a situation in which a great majority of the actions in the arch are in Γ. In the second stage, the agents repeat the actions of the matching arch forever.
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The cell's structure The purpose of the computed region is to make sure that the strategy is of m-recall. The rest of the cell is called the random region. The actions in the random region are drawn randomly, uniformly, and independently of the rest of the actions in the random regions of the entire cycle.
The computed region is composed of three components:
• the cell's number, i ∈ [l],
• a state, s ∈ {SEARCHING, SEARCH FAILED, LOOPING},
• a color (described later).
The information in each component is encoded in the agent's alphabet, A. Since l ≤ 6M/m ≤ 6 log|A×B| log|A×B|−log|Γ| , the size (number of letters) of the first two components is fixed (it does not depend on m, only on |Γ| and |A × B|). The size of the third component is O(log m). The precise size of the color component is discussed later.
The cell number
An encoding of the number i ∈ [l] in the alphabet A.
The state
The state enables the search for a matching arch despite the fact that M can be greater than m, the recall capacity of the agents. We wish to describe the current state as a function of the actions in the previous cell. We begin with a formal definition of a matching arch.
Definition 3.4. Let a = (a 1 t , a 2 t ) t∈Z be a sequences of joint actions of the agents. We say that sM + [M ] is a matching arch of a, if (a 1 t , a 2 t ) ∈ Γ, for every t ∈ sM
With the above definition in mind, finding a satisfying search scheme is straightforward. Here is the alternative we've chosen. Suppose the previous cell number was i and the previous state was s. The actions taken in the previous cell were
The current cell number i is given by i = i + 1 mod l. The current state s is given by the following rules:
• if s = LOOPING, then s = LOOPING.
• if s = SEARCHING,
• if s = SEARCH FAILED,
The color
Recall that in the first stage the agent draws a (partially) random cycle a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a M L , a M L+1 = a 1 , . . . (whose state and color components are as yet undefined). In order to make the cycle implementable through an m-recall strategy, it is sufficient to have
. . , a s+m ) = (a t+1 , . . . , a t+m ) (3.1)
In the second stage, once a matching arch (say Ω = {sM + 1, . . . , (s + 1)M }) is found, the agent repeats the actions of that arch forever. In order to implement this behavior with m-recall it is sufficient to have
where x%y is defined by x%y ∈ [y],
Our goal is to set the content of color components such that (3.1) and (3.2) will hold. To do so, we define a graph G = E, V whose vertices correspond to the cells, i.e., V = [L] × [l]. The edges, E, correspond to places where there is a possibility (by an improper coloring) that either (3.1) or (3.2) will not hold.
Note that the placement of # actions and numbering of cells guarantee that (3.1) and (3.2) can only fail if s = t mod M . We divide (3.1) and (3.2) to m 2 cases (not necessarily disjoint). The kth case is that of s = t = K i − k mod M for some i ∈ [l]. Accordingly, let us define sets of edges E For every k = 1, . . . , m 2 define:
if a s +j and a t +j are defined, then they are equal,
if a s −s %M +(s +j)%M and a t −t %M +(t +j)%M are defined, then they are equal, where x (x = s, t) is the integer that satisfies (x − 1)M < x ≤ xM , and x = K i + 1 − k mod M Note that if we manage to encode a vertices coloring of G within the color component of the corresponding cells, then (3.1) and (3.2) will be satisfied. To ensure (with high probability) that the chromatic number of G is small enough to fit in the color component, we restrict L from above. Let δ > 0. We restrict L by
We would like to color G with md colors. For our purposes the size of the color component can be log A (md) . The size of the rest of the computed region is constant (as m grows); therefore the size of the entire computed region, r, is less than 2 log A (md). The set of vertexes, V , can be partitioned into disconnected sets
Since l is bounded (by a constant independent of m) we only have to consider the induced graph on
], * = 1, 2. In these graphs every connected component is a clique. We estimate the probability that G ( * ) k contains a clique of size d + 1.
Let E be the event that the graph G is md colorable for both agents. We have, so far, proved that Pr(E) → 1 (as m → ∞) and that, in E, σ and τ are m-recall strategies. Also, the induced play contains the # action as frequently as required.
We turn, now, to the stopping time in which a matching arch is encountered. Call this stopping time T . 
Let (α, β) = (α j , β j ) j∈R be permutations that preserve Γ, provided by the homogeneity of Γ. The permutation (α, β) defines a transformation,
, by operating on every arch at once. The transformation θ is a permutation. The distribution of the random actions is uniform on
, denote θ.X(ω) = X(θ(ω)). Since (α, β)(Γ R ) = Γ R , the stopping time T is θ invariant, i.e., θ.T = T . The graph G, described above, is also θ invariant; therefore θ(E) = E. Consider the play (a t , b t ) t∈N conditioned on {T < ∞} ∩ E. Apply θ and get a new process θ.(a t , b t ) t∈N that has the same distribution. Since the stopping time is the same for both processes we have
Denote the cycle that agent one (resp. two) draws a (resp. b). For s ∈ [L1] and t ∈ [L2], let E s,t be the event that (a sM +j , b tM +j ) ∈ Γ, ∀j ∈ R. Note that E s,t = {T < ∞}.
We show that E s,t are pairwise independent. Consider w.l.o.g. the events E s,t and E s,t , t = t . Fix any (a) ∈ A R . Obviously, E s,t and E s,t are independent given (a) s+R ; therefore it is sufficient to show that Pr(E s,t |(a) s+R = a) does not depend on a. For a ∈ A let Γ a be the section {(a, b) ∈ Γ : b ∈ B}. By the assumption that A and B are minimal w.r.t. the property Γ ⊂ A × B, and by the homogeneity of Γ, we have that the cardinality of Γ a is the same for every a ∈ A. Clearly, Pr(E s,t |(a) s+R = a) = j∈R |Γa s+j | |B| . Define a random variable X = s,t 1 Es,t . Write α = |Γ| |A×B| . By Markov's inequality we have
The lemma assumes that |A × B| m ≥
|A×B| |Γ|

M
. This assumption can be strength-
, for some ξ > 0. Let δ be so small that
Combining (3.5) and (3.6) we have
This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.3.
A proof for Theorem 2.3
For any discrete random variables X, Y and Z, the mutual information of X and Y given Z satisfies
(3.7)
In addition, if A and B are independent, then
Consider an arbitrary pair of mixed m-recall strategies for agents one and two. The strategies induce a play. Let a 1 , a 2 . . . be random variables that distribute according to the limiting average of that play. By (3.7), the stationarity of the limiting average, the chain rule of entropy, (3.8), and the conditional entropy inequality (C.E.I.) we get
C.E.I: a i t is a function of a t−m , . . . , a t−1 and σ i H(a 1 , . . . , a m ) (3.9)
First, we refer to (2.3), which is equivalent to (2.3a) and to
. By (3.9) we have
In this section we obtain non-trivial results on the individually rational level in repeated games with bounded recall. We begin by introducing the notation, then presenting previously known results, and conclude by presenting new results and a few conjectures.
A → R N be a finite N -person game in normal form. The individually rational level (also called the min-max level ) of player i is the level below which the team of all players but player i cannot force the payoff of player i. Formally, it is defined by
The security level (also called the max-min level ) of player i is the value that player i can guarantee against all other players. It is the value of the two-person zero-sum game defined by player i's payoff function. We denote this game G i . The security level of player i is the following quantity:
We denote by G[m 1 , . . . , m N ] the infinitely repeated version of G, where each player i is restricted to m i -recall strategies.
Consider a sequence of games G[m 1 (n), . . . , m N (n)], n ∈ N. By considering only uncorrelated actions, Theorem 1 in [Leh88] implies that if lim n→∞
In the case of two-person games (i.e. N = 2), the individually rational and security levels are the same; therefore inequality (4.1) provides a tight estimation for the bounded-recall individually rational level. In the case of N > 2 the picture is less clear. Even the special case where all the players have the same recall capacity is not resolved. Currently, we are not even able to show the existence of the limit of IRL i G[m, . . . , m], as m grows. One may erroneously presume that if a player's recall capacity is at least as large as that of the other players, then the other players cannot device a correlated punishment against that player. The following corollary of Theorem 2.1 shows that lim sup m→∞ IRL i G[m 1 , . . . , m N ] can be arbitrarily close to val G i even if player i's recall capacity is greater than that of the other players:
Corollary 4.1. For every > 0 and every positive integer C, there exists a finite three-player game G such that
We say that two actions of player one, a and b, are strategically equivalent if g(a, x, y) = g(b, x, y), for every pair of actions x and y of player two and three, respectively. Let {G n } be games obtained from G by appending player one's action space with n new actions {x 1 , . . . , x n }, which are strategically equivalent to some action a ∈ A 1 . Claim 4.2. For every positive integer C,
Corollary 4.1 stems from Claim 4.2 by choosing G such that IRL 3 G = 1 and val G 3 = 0. Such a game exists since any game in which the individually rational level and security level differ can be transformed to a game with the desired properties through an appropriate affine transformation of the payoff function of player three.
We turn, now, to proving Claim 4.2. Let Q ∈ ∆(A 1 ×A 2 ) be an optimal strategy for the team of players one and two in the game G 3 . Choose P n ∈ ∆({x 1 , . . . , x n } × A 2 ), a strategy for the team in the game G n , such that H(P n ) ≥ log n. Let
The right-hand side of (4.2) converges to zero, as n → ∞. Let 1 ≥ > 0 and n ∈ N such that
By Theorem 2.1, there exists m 0 such that for every m ≥ m 0 there exist m-recall strategies for players one and two that ignore player three's actions and the limiting average of the induced play (a 1,2
We use an argument called Neyman-Okada's criterion (see [Per08, 
Consequently, since Pr(
We have just established the following upper bound:
The proof is concluded with an equal lower bound, given in (4.1).
Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 suggest that the ratio between the recall capacities of the players is the relevant quantity in estimating the individually rational level. Theorem 2.1 and Neyman-Okada's criterion [Per08, pp. 7-8] resolve the extreme case in which the recall capacity of the maximizing player is much smaller than that of the other players. Let G be a finite three-person game.
The other extreme case, where the recall capacity of the maximizing player is much greater than that of the other players is left as a conjecture. Proposition 4.3 can be strengthened. The number of players can be greater than tree. Moreover, the minimizing team may be restricted to pure Cm-recall strategies, for some constant C that depends on the one-step game.
Proposition 4.5. Let G be an N -person game. There exists a constant C = C(G), such that lim
where g 1 (σ) := E g 1 (a 1 ), and a 1 , a 2 , . . . is the limiting average play induced by σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ N ).
Proof. Restricting the team to pure strategies turns the game into a two-person zero-sum game, the game G 1 [m, Cm]; therefore we may assume without loss of generality that G = A = A 1 × A 2 , g : A → R is in deed a two-person zero-sum game. Let q ∈ ∆(A 2 ) be an optimal strategy for player two. If H(q) = 0, then the result holds trivially. Let C > log|A| H(q) . Let δ = 1/2(H(q)C − log |A|), and n = n m = exp ((H(q)C − δ)m) . The first stage in the construction of the strategies in the proof of Lemma 3.3 (alternatively, Proposition 4.9 in [Per08] ) show that there exists an oblivious mixed strategy µ m ∈ ∆(Σ 2 (Cm)) that induces a play y 1 , y 2 , . . . such that for every T ∈ N
• emp(y T +1 , . . . , y T +n ) − q = o(1) µ m almost surely, The same argument can be pushed a little further. Definē
where the distribution of (x, y, n) is Q. 
